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
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DCI'S Annual
Rpt - 1978
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DCI'S ANNUAL REPORT

PAO Comments on National/Tactical Interface Section

Page Reference

Recommendations

page 117

Delete first paragraph and substitute a paragraph along the following lines:

"The convergence of four trends have made the national/tactical interface a pervasive influence on a number of developments within the Intelligence Community: an advancing technology capable of providing near-real-time coverage of time-sensitive intelligence activities; the continuing interest of the Congress in rationalizing the programs it is called upon to fund; the promulgation of Presidential Directive 37 on "national space policy;" and the growth in understanding of the interface among Community managers at all levels. The national/tactical interface "issue," however, is really a convenient label used to refer to a variety of programmatic issues that focus on a number of specific tradeoffs involving requirements, uses, control, costs, dependability, etc."

page 117

Modify second paragraph to read as follows:

"In spite of our inability to precisely describe the interface, Presidential Directive 37 on national space policy leaves no doubt as to the intent of this Administration."

page 118

Modify first paragraph to read as follows:

"The Congress, for its part, is primarily interested in trying to rationalize the programs it is asked to fund, and so regularly scrutinizes the integration/duplication aspects of the interface and the appropriateness of classifying specific intelligence activities in the NFIP or DoD Intelligence-Related Activities (IRA) budgets."

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Page Reference

Recommendations

page 118

Modify second paragraph to read as follows:

"In recognition of the above interests and developments, the Intelligence Community has made a major effort to highlight national/tactical issues in its intelligence and military planning; tried to educate both national and tactical command elements by sponsoring a number of exercises and tests designed to evaluate the tactical applicability of satellite collection systems; and to work out specific program and funding requirements to improve existing capabilities and/or to provide for future assets. I sense that there is a growing feeling in the intelligence and military communities that we are gradually making progress--certainly in understanding a variety of problems, developing agendas for future work, and working out arrangements for effecting the interface between national systems and tactical users."

page 118

Delete fourth paragraph from section. Paragraph does not really contribute to discussion.

pages 118-119

Modify third paragraph to read as follows:

"To maintain a balanced perspective, it is also important to recognize that while the content of national and tactical information needs may be similar or even identical, the context within which the intelligence is used will vary greatly between national needs and tactical needs. The context of the needs is, in fact, shaped by the use to which the information will be put--national policy formulation, crisis and conflict management on the one hand and battle management on the other. Indications and Warning (I&W) and crisis management provide prime examples of circumstances in which both national and tactical authorities have a pressing need to call on the same intelligence assets, but for different reasons--policy formulation on the one hand and battlefield management on the other."

page 119

Delete that portion of the paragraph after the sentence which reads "few systems...simultaneously." Do not agree with the "few" sentence. Not convinced that the "one legacy" is valid. Last sentence in paragraph not really clear to me.

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| <u>Page Reference</u> | <u>Recommendations</u> |
|-----------------------|---|
| page 120 | Modify paragraph one to read as follows: "Last January, the Secretary of Defense and I forwarded a "Report on the National/Tactical Interface" to the Congress. This report identified nine closely related but specifically distinct areas of concern and outlined ongoing and newly initiated management actions designed to address each area of concern. As a follow-on to this report, the DoD has developed a plan for intelligence support to tactical forces. Purpose of the plan is to provide management direction and guidelines under which DoD acquires and operates systems that provide intelligence support to tactical forces." |
| page 120 | In view of the rewrite of paragraph one, delete the last four sentences from paragraph three. |
| page 121 | Reorder the two sentences in paragraph two. |
| page 121 | Insert a new paragraph (just before "Who Pays" paragraph) which reads as follows: "During the past year, the military Services, under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continued to evaluate the tactical applicability of satellite collection systems during field tests and special projects. The more significant tests were Special Project GRAVITY SCORE and COLD FIRE in Europe and Special Project COPE PACE in Korea." |
| page 121 | Delete the "Who Pays" paragraph. Not convinced that the "national-level informational needs" are more costly than the tactical requirements for more timely coverage, better accuracy, greater processing capabilities, more platforms and an expanded capability to process and disseminate near-real-time intelligence. |
| pages 122-123 | Do not like "future needs" paragraph, but do not have a substitute for you to consider. Actually, do not agree with the thrust of the paragraphs on "compartmentation" and "integration-processor systems." |

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

18 December 1978

TO: PAO'ers

FROM:

As PAO's point-of-contact for preparation of the DCI's Annual Report, asked that I solicit comments within PAO on a draft version.

Attachment 1 includes Diana's covering memo and the report's Table of Contents. In an attempt to satisfy the request for a gross screening by COB tomorrow (19 December), I've extracted sections that seem most relevant to your areas of interest and have included them as Attachment 2. Please review for accuracy, completeness, etc., and return any comments to me by noon tomorrow.

I have one copy of the complete draft (120 pages) that is available for anyone interested in reviewing other sections.


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DCI's Annual Report (Comments on)

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P 15-17, 34-35, 39-44
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15 December 1978

NOTE FOR: All RM Hands

SUBJECT: DCI's Annual Report

1. Here is a first full working draft of the DCI's Annual Report. As approved by the DCI in October, it is selective, not comprehensive. A lot of important topics are left out. Those that are in are largely a combination of the DCI's interests and the Congress'. (U)

2. It is uneven, of course, reflecting the uneven quality of the input I got and my own uneven experience with various parts of the intelligence business. Please identify to me places that need to be "denser" (not necessarily longer). (U)

I myself am particularly unhappy with the paragraph on planning for ELINT mix, but ELINT input I asked for came back as SIGINT generally or dissections of specific budget items. Should we try to develop an intelligent lay introduction to the complexities of ELINT upgrades (as I have tried to do for HE Modernization, however imperfectly). Or should we dangle [redacted] type bits off SIGINT at large? The Annual Report should be broad gauged and educational, not the FY 1980 budget revisited, but do we have anything useful to say at a general level? (TS/SI/TK)

3. Those of you famous for your overview talents, please read for overall tone, thrust, balance, etc., whatever your job description. (U)

4. Program monitors and others with specific beats please vet those sections for accuracy and other content, including a check on paragraph classifications. In many cases individual sections have already been vetted by you and/or the principal Community contributor(s); in other cases sections are now out for that purpose. Please check with me before circulating pieces further (Green 1138), and please don't circulate a copy of this full draft anywhere outside RM. NFIB review of a revised full draft is the next stage. (C)

5. The present bulk can undoubtedly be cut (although the printers tell us it will shrink 8:1 in final). Those of you who like to cut please feel free to make suggestions. (U)

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6. We need to turn around a cleaner draft before the DCI goes on leave (21-27 Dec); therefore a gross screening by Tuesday 19 th would be helpful, with a finer grain review at more leisure during any of the holiday period you plan to work. (U)

Thanks

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(S)

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additional telecommunications capacity and survivability, and consider redundant data bases and telecommunication paths for the most critical data. The capacity of these systems becomes particularly critical during crisis situations when the use of ADP systems and demands on related telecommunications tend to surge at all levels. (C)

NATIONAL/TACTICAL INTERFACE

The convergence of four trends have made the nat/tact interface a pervasive influence on a number of developments, including the National/Tactical Interface (NTI) is more a passage than a fence, and the National/Tactical Interface "issue" is really a label for a large and various collection of specific trade-offs involving requirements, uses, control, costs, dependability, etc.

Presidential Directive 37 on National Space Policy gives a clear overall charge concerning support to tactical commanders by high-technology national intelligence systems:

Support of military operational requirements is a major space intelligence mission. National space intelligence assets shall provide support to deployed military operational forces in balance with their primary mission capabilities. In order to ensure a proper balance between the national and tactical missions of these assets, there will be military involvement in the requirements, tasking, exploitation, and dissemination functions and in the development program. The Secretary of Defense will, together with the Director of Central Intelligence, ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs, and the Secretary of Defense will provide the

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Director of Central Intelligence all information necessary
for this purpose. (S)

The Congress, for its part, is quite naturally concerned
to rationalize the programs it is asked to fund, and so regularly
scrutinizes ^{the} integration/duplication, and the appropriateness of placement
of specific intelligence activities in the NFIP (national) or DoD
Intelligence-Related Activities (IRA) budgets. (U)

In recognition of the common interests & developments,
Over the last few years we have increasingly studied
national-tactical issues in our intelligence and military planning;

tried to educate both national and tactical command elements to their
relationships via exercises ^{a number of} and the like; and worked out specific
program and funding arrangements. I sense that there is a growing

feeling in the intelligence and military communities that we are
gradually making progress--certainly in understanding and agendas for
future work, and even in working arrangements. (U)

Technical issues, these involve, there must be some that a number of
Among the current significant general national-tactical ^{to maintain a balanced} subject,
dilemmas that present themselves in numerous specific cases are:
exist to maintain the balance with respect to the subject.

Awareness and Restraint: At the national level, and particularly
among non-military managers, there is not always sufficient appreciation
of the realities of the requirement on tactical commanders to plan combat
operations expeditiously in detail, and to be postured to execute them. This
requirement in turn induces tactical levels to seek the insurance of a hostilities
requirements load that poses real cost and capacity dilemmas for intelligence
systems. (U)

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~~Different Users can handle:~~ While the ~~content of the national~~ and tactical information ~~is~~ tasks to these intelligence systems may be similar or even identical, the context ^{in which the intelligence is used will} varies greatly between national needs and tactical needs. ^{The context is the needs, in fact,} shaped by the use to which the information ^{will} be put--battle management on the one hand and national policy formulation, crisis and conflict management on the other. Intelligence systems may appear unnecessarily redundant if only ^{the} content of need is considered, but not when context is considered. Indications and Warning (I&W) and crisis management provide prime examples of circumstances in which both national and tactical authorities have a pressing need to call on the same intelligence assets, but for different reasons--policy formulation on the one hand, and ~~small unit redeployment~~ ^{battle field management} and readiness on the other. Few systems can handle both requirements simultaneously. One legacy of the technological revolution is the realization that "total ground truth" in the battle area is conceivable for the first time and thus desirable as a programmatic goal. The greatest interest in all the finely detailed texture of "total ground truth" lies with the lower level tactical commander, while the capability to provide it tends to be costly, technologically risky and, in most cases, economic only if centrally managed. Tactical commanders, on the other hand, have wanted to exploit the new technology through facilities and platforms which are not only optimized to their tactical needs ^{but more apt to remain under their control.} (U)

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Last January, the Secretary of Defense and I forwarded to Congress a report on the National-Tactical Interface, ^{which identified more closely} highlighting a ^{release but specifically identified areas of concern} ~~number of areas of critical~~ concern. The report addressed the need for improved formulation of tactical intelligence requirements, ~~quicker~~, more responsive tasking and feedback procedures, more reliable and survivable communications with improved processing to meet increased timeliness and accuracy requirements, additional survivability improvements to both space systems and their associated ground stations and the development of new technology to meet presently unsatisfied needs. (S)

In the requirements area, a significant step forward was taken when the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy sponsored a requirements review based on assigned mission and derived intelligence needs. Done in conjunction with the Unified & Specified Commands, this mission oriented requirements review resulted in an exhaustive integrated listing reflecting intelligence needs at various levels in the tactical command structure. (U)

With respect to tasking and feedback procedures, my Deputy for Collection Tasking is now responsible for ensuring sufficient tasking responsiveness of national intelligence systems for national needs, and for advisory tasking of tactical systems for national needs. DoD is developing a master tactical intelligence support plan, in which my staff is participating at each stage. This project is to provide the valid statement of tactical intelligence needs for prospective fulfillment by the NFIP. Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored exercises and a test program are allowing the military services to experiment with tactical

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application of national intelligence systems, most significantly this past year in exercises GRAVITY SCORE and COLD FIRE in Europe. Progress was made particularly in understanding the technical feasibility of using tactical systems. (S)

Survivability improvements were considered this past year for all National Reconnaissance Program satellite systems, and funding for those which did not interfere with or substantially improved mission performance have been requested. These steps are modest in proportion to the potential crisis and hostilities vulnerability of our intelligence satellites; as I have indicated above, satellite survivability involves a particularly acute set of need-cost dilemmas. (S)

The outstanding development of new technology applicable to national/tactical matters in 1978 was the detailed evaluation and procurement recommendation for ☐ Tactical use of this capability is one of its most important features and justifications. With respect to ^{new} technology ~~across the board~~, my Deputy for Resource Management now sits with the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council to represent intelligence perspectives, including national-tactical considerations. (TS/TK, ☐)

NRO

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Who Pays: National/tactical trade-offs regularly have to be faced very explicitly in program and budget review. For example, the significant cost drivers for intelligence satellites from a technical design standpoint tend to originate in the national-level informational needs, while tactical needs tend to drive the scope of a system (e.g., number of platforms, processing capacity). Since content of need from both national and tactical levels does tend to overlap ☐ 1909-78/5

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desired technical specifications can be fairly easily resolved. The principal contextual demands which make the tactical problem special--timeliness, partly dependent on frequency of pass; and precision, partly dependent on distribution of sensors--can then be approached through expansion of a system. Just such an approach is being taken

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with regard to the [] satellite system [] a "national" system whose value to tactical commanders will be multiplied by additional platforms paid for by the Department of Defense and managed within the NFIP by the National Reconnaissance Office. (TS//SI []

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Future Needs: There is reasonable consensus that among our principal agenda items for further national/tactical interface work include:

-- Communications; systems adequate to support an effective exchange of intelligence information in a widespread combat environment. Critiques of recent major joint exercises have documented present inadequacies, indicating that US communications systems are inefficient and slow in peacetime, saturated and unresponsive during crisis, and likely to be inadequate, unreliable and rapidly degraded in a major war.

-- Compartmentation; Stringent measures are required to conceal the extent of our collection capabilities, to include an extremely discriminating approach to releasing the products of these collection systems to foreigners, allies included. Yet in every part of the world, our forces are or would be cheek-by-jowl with allied forces, and our policy is that they would work as one in combatting a common enemy. These allied units, however, cannot base their operational planning and decisionmaking on the same intelligence as do US units. (S)

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Means need to be devised to accustom allies to using products from "beyond-the-apparent-state-of-the-art" collection assets, and some review of compartmentation ground rules may also be indicated. (S)

-- Development of compact, high capacity integrator-processor systems: The tactical commander, as a rule, does not have the time and cannot afford to be encumbered by currently available equipment for sorting, ranking, and integrating intelligence data from national technical systems. These functions could, of course, be performed for him elsewhere, e.g., at a centralized location in the US. But elsewhere means remote from his control, and with yet another inherently vulnerable communication link connecting him to it. (S)